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Abstract 
This paper provides an analytical model representing four polar ethical approaches, by linking them 
to the main ethics suggested by the philosophical, psychological, and socio-economic literature. 
Moreover, it develops the analytical model in order to obtain rankings of the 4 polar ethical 
approaches in terms of happiness and, consequently, to provide insights on which ethical approach 
should be adopted by each individual, according to his characteristics (income level, in DCs or in 
LDCs, aspiration level): some dynamics are predicted, if the Golden and the Copper rules are 
applied. Finally, this paper provides insights on which ethical approach should be adopted by each 
society, according to its characteristics (DCs or LDCs, social distribution of aspiration levels), by 
predicting happiness levels in alternative countries, according to the prevailing ethics, and by 
comparing these predictions with the observed happiness levels, in order to provide an empirical 
test of the analytical model: some dynamics are predicted, with non-Protestant DCs moving to 
higher, and Protestant DCs towards lower, happiness levels (conditioned to the per capita income), 
due to the increasing and decreasing rejection of the Golden and Copper rules, respectively, and 
with LDCs moving to lower (conditioned to the increasing per capita income) in the short-run and 
higher happiness levels in the long run, by establishing and entertaining conditions that set clear 
incentives for moral behaviour, in order to increase and decrease the adoption of the Golden and 
Copper rules, respectively. 
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1.Introduction 
There is a huge philosophical, psychological and economic literature aiming at defining the 
constituents of happiness (for recent examples, Haybron, 2000; Haybron, 2003; Simsek, 2008) and 
at identifying the moral norms for individuals to achieve it (for recent examples, Degli Antoni, 
2009; Konow and Earley, 2008; Martin, 2008; Binswanger, 2006; Kaun, 2005). 
The first purpose of this paper is to provide a simple analytical model in order to summarise the 
main features of happiness and the main ethical approaches suggested in the literature, under very 
general assumptions. Some extensions are highlighted, where actions are characterized by dynamics 
(for example, actions at t+1 depend on actions at time t), happiness is characterized by dynamics 
(for example, there is stock or psychological well-being and a flow or subjective well-being; again, 
aspiration levels move up step by step deterministically or change stochastically), where actions of 
each individual are linked to actions taken by other people (think of the Copper rule, i.e. “Do (or 
don't do) unto others as they do (or don't do) unto you”), and where individual happiness is affected 
by actions taken by other people (think of the Golden rule i.e. “Do (or don't do) unto others what 
you would (or would not) have them do unto you”), and where people may experiment new ethical 
approaches (for example, the ethical approach at time t+1 is the same as at time t apart from a 
casual variable with a specified stochastic distribution). A “by product” of this first purpose will be 
a ranking of ethical approaches in terms of individual happiness as dependent of individual 
characteristics. 
Next, there is a huge psychological, social and economic literature aiming at motivating (for recent 
examples, Pflug, 2008; Lu, 2001) or at assessing (for recent examples, Welsch, 2003; Peirò, 2006; 
Inglehart et al., 2008; Heylighen and Bernheim, 2000; Haller and Hadler, 2006; Veenhoven, 2005; 
Hayo, 2007; Lelkes, 2006) the observed differences in happiness contents in different countries or 
cultures, on the one hand; on the other hand, at justifying (for recent examples, Robertson and 
Crittenden, 2003; Gossling, 2003; Jensen, 2008) or at measuring (for recent examples, Brammer et 
al., 2006; Franke and Nadler, 2008, Forsyth et al., 2008; Guiso et al., 2003; Cherry et al., 2003; 
Beekun et al., 2005; Ahmed et al. 2003; Singhapakdi et al., 2001; Karande et al., 2000; Tavakoli et 
al., 2003; Vasquez et al. 2001; Volkema & Fleury, 2002; Lu & Gilmour, 2004; Robertson et al. 
2002; Zabid and Ho, 2003; Zabid and Ibrahim, 2008; Kracher et al., 2002; Vittel and Patwardhan, 
2008; Marta et al, 2001; Blodgood et al., 2008) the observed differences in ethical approaches 
prevailing in different countries or cultures. 
The second purpose of this paper is to apply the analytical model to explain the observed 
differences in happiness in different countries or cultures in terms of the observed different ethical 
approaches prevailing in different countries or cultures, under very plausible assumptions. Some 
extensions are highlighted, where actions of each individual are linked to actions taken by other 
people, and where individual happiness is affected by actions taken by other people. A “by product” 
of this second purpose will be a ranking of ethical approaches in terms of social happiness as 
dependent of social characteristics. 
Notice that most bibliographic references will relate to economic issues (rather than to environment, 
property rights, professional duties or health issues): the economic contexts are more relevant for 
social interactions between individual actions and happiness, which we would like to stress here, 
and the ascription of alternative ethical approaches to different countries or cultures, which we 
would like to highlight here, are more often based on experiments eliciting behaviours in simulated 
economic contexts. 
 
2.The analytical model 
The purpose of this section is to obtain mathematical formulas representing the main ethical 
approaches proposed by the philosophical, psychological, and socio-economic literature. 
Freedom, as a pre-condition for happiness, has been stressed as an ultimate value (think of idealistic 
theories) or as an instrumental value (think of materialistic theories) (Chekola, 2007). We will adopt 
the instrumental definition, by referring to freedom of (i.e. individual choice), to (i.e. access to 
resources for real choices), and from (i.e. absence of obstacles for individual choices), for its 
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measurement. In section 4 we will see that empirical research estimates freedom as the social 
tolerance of out-groups, or as gender equality, … (Haller and Hadler, 2006). 
Moreover, happiness has been defined as a state of mind or as a mix of state of mind and state of 
the world. The affective and the hedonic dimensions have been linked to the state of mind, while 
the cognitive dimension have been associated to the state of the world. Several combinations have 
been suggested. For example, the subjective well-being theory combine the affective and cognitive 
dimension; the hedonic view reduces happiness to subjects’ balance of pleasure over displeasure; 
the life-satisfaction view focuses on the cognitive dimension; the affective-state theory identifies 
happiness with subjects’ overall emotional states; the ontological well-being theory develops the 
subjective well-being by referring to life as a personal goal or project. We will not adopt a specific 
happiness definition, while we will assume that the conception of happiness is a folk notion that 
does not depend on cultural differences, i.e. as a state of mind, happiness is universal. However, 
Haybron (2007) recently highlighted that ethical norms are crucial in happiness assessment, i.e. its 
meaning takes cultural-specific forms. We will assume that cultural differences could drive people 
to follow a specific ethics. In section 4 we will see that 97% of people interviewed in 52 countries 
from 1981 to 2007 have specified their level of happiness, suggesting that people understand the 
question and can readily answer it (Inglehart et al., 2008). In other words, it is plausible that 
people from different cultures have a different concept of happiness, but they succeed in evaluating 
its level over a common scale (Heylighen and Bernheim, 2000). 
Finally, rationality, as a pre-condition for happiness, has been identified in applying appropriate 
reason to choose the best possible means to attain one’s ends (instrumental rationality); to choose 
(possibly non-selfish) ends and motivations that give genuine happiness, by reflecting on values and 
ends, by determining what is really good for oneself, by considering the long-term consequences of 
one’s behaviour, and by considering one’s sense of morality (expressive or evaluative rationality); 
or these concepts combined (true rationality) (Tomer, 2008). We will assume that people pursue 
happiness by choosing freely in all realms of life, including the choice of the ethical approach, but 
under individual and social constraints, by measuring as lack of freedom the situation where people 
do not attain happiness, because of the social impact on the feasible ethical approaches that can be 
truly rationally chosen. Besides, the normative rationality (i.e. to conform to a moral value or ideal) 
or the epistemic rationality (i.e. to hold beliefs grounded on religious experience and religious 
emotions) (Mitchell, 2007) will be depicted in section 3.3 as a dynamic extension of the suggested 
model, although the latter applies to beliefs more than behaviours (Jerolmack and Porpora, 2004), 
and the former could not explain religious conversions (Barro and Hwang, 2007). In section 4 we 
will see that empirical research estimates rationality as the access to education and information, the 
number of scientists and engineers per capita, … (Welsh, 2003). 
For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to four alternative polar ethical approaches only. The first 
couple of approaches (1 and 2) assume that actions are chosen to pursue goals, with goals specified 
by the individual (approach 2) or derived from external sources (social norms, moral principles, …) 
(approach 1). This is the case of consequential behaviour (or teleological theory by Hunt and Vitell, 
1986), where actions are assumed to be taken in order to maximize the goal achievements, although 
non-maximisation attitudes could also be represented as explained below. These two ethics 
emphasise happiness. The second couple of approaches (I and II) assume that actions are suggested 
by external sources (philosophical insights, religious principles, …), with goals specified by the 
individual (approach II) or derived from external sources (society, religion, …) (approach I). This is 
the case of non-consequential behaviour (or ontological theory by Hunt and Vitell, 1986). These 
two ethics emphasise freedom. 
Let us define fj as the expected happiness from achieving the goal j, and aij as the action i linked to 
the goal j, with aij≥ 0 and fj≥ 0 Next, let us name λk and µl the Lagrange multipliers. Therefore, the 
following four polar cases will be considered: 
 
1. Max (aij) ∑j ∑i fj aij s.t. gk(a1k,   aik,   ank)≤ 0 so aij* and λk* depending on fj 
2. Max (aij, fj) ∑j ∑i fj aij s.t. gk(a1k,   aik,   ank)≤ 0, hl(f1,   fj,   fm)≤ 0 so aij**, fj**, λk** and µl** 
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F(1) = ∑k λk* depending on fj is a measure of the lack of freedom for (1) 
H(1) = ∑j ∑i fj aij*is a measure of happiness for (1) depending on fj 
F(2) = ∑k λk** + ∑l µl** is a measure of the lack of freedom for (2) 
H(2) = ∑j ∑i fj**aij** is a measure of happiness for (2) 
 
I. Solve (a1k,   aik,   ank) λk=0 for each k linked to (1) so aij^ depending on fj 
II. Solve (a1k,   aik,   ank,f1,   fj,   fm) λk=0 and µl=0 for each k and l linked to (2) so aij^^ and fj^^ 
 
H(I) = ∑j ∑i fj aij^ is a measure of happiness for (I) 
H(II) = ∑j ∑i fj^^ aij^^ is a measure of happiness for (II) 
 
Six remarks are needed here. First, freedom is patently defined as freedom from restrictions, where 
these refer to any kinds of individual constraints: economic, social, moral, …, while happiness is 
deliberately unspecified, because any definition of happiness can fit the suggested framework: 
psychological happiness or philosophical happiness, happiness as state of mind or as well-
being/welfare, happiness as pleasure (short-run vs. long-run) or as life satisfaction, … Second, 
although some ethical approaches are logically incompatible (for example, 1 and 2, I and II), some 
others are not logically inconsistent (for example, 1 or 2 and II): indeed, some ethics focus on 
individual, while others on social norms. Third, since actions aij are multiplied by happiness from 
goals fj, both process and outcome happiness is depicted: the process happiness, by thinking that fj 
is attached to the action itself, not to its consequences; the outcome happiness, by thinking that fj is 
attached to the outcome achieved by performing actions linked to it (Konow and Earley, 2008). 
Fourth, goals fj could be intrinsic, i.e. oriented towards self-acceptance, affiliation and community 
feeling, or extrinsic, i.e. oriented towards some external reward such as financial success, popularity 
and attractiveness (Sheldom and Lyubomirsky, 2006). Fifth, actions of each individual could be 
linked to happiness achieved by other people (think of individual altruism), i.e. fj represents 
happiness achieved by others (for example, Martin, 2007). Six, individual happiness could be 
affected by happiness achieved by other people (think of social relationships), i.e. aij depicts efforts 
to set up social relations: the effect of social relations on well-being (for example, Degli Antoni, 
2008) could be depicted by assuming that actions aij aim at establishing social contacts and that fj 
measures the happiness from these social relations. 
Moreover, Lagrange multipliers measure constraints (i.e. lack of freedom, in case 1 and 2) in terms 
of the missed achievement of the objective function (i.e. happiness, in case 1 and 2). Thus, we can 
sum up happiness and freedom measures to obtain the overall happiness of these ethical approaches 
1 and 2 (V(1) and V(2)), while the overall happiness of case I and II (V(I) and V(II)) is given by the 
happiness measures, since there is no lack of freedom in these approaches, by assumption. 
 
V(1) = H(1) – F(1), V(2) = H(2) – F(2), V(I) = H(I), V(II) = H(II). 
 
Three remarks are needed here. First, this framework suggests that individuals perceive 
unhappiness and restriction as bad things, while happiness and freedom are perceived as good 
things. However, individuals are assumed to be sometimes unable to freely choose the ethics to be 
followed (and consequently, they will perceive a smaller overall happiness of the chosen ethics, due 
to an additional lack of freedom, which is not included in the suggested model, but which could be 
depicted in a meta-model representing the choice of the ethical approach), by stressing that this 
choice is often driven by, or it is constrained by, prevailing social norms (Haybron, 2007). Second, 
this framework proposes to sum up the consistent measures of happiness and freedom, in 
accordance to the human development theory: freedom turns out to explain 30% of changes 
observed on the Subjective Well-Being index (Welzel et al., 2003) and to be the most significant 
variable in explaining the inter-country happiness differences (Hayo, 2007). Third, this framework 
suggests that actions and/or goals are chosen before ethics. However, it could also be referred to the 
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opposite circumstance, to depict situations where ethical approaches are chosen once actions are 
taken and goals are achieved or not achieved, to obtain an ex-post life assessment (Haybron, 2007). 
Finally, having clearly in mind that the four ethical approaches depicted above are polar cases, so 
that many other ethical approaches could be discussed, some similarities between them and some 
ethical approaches suggested in the philosophical literature are highlighted below. 
• Case 1 could depict Mill’s concept of hedonism: preferences are given (although they can be 
influenced by external factors), and the individual aims at maximising pleasure (Ng, 1999; Warke, 
2000). 
• Case 2 could represent Sen’s notions of functioning and capability: people perceive their 
capabilities, and try to approach it as much as they can, i.e. they choose their goals and they act to 
achieve them (Giri, 2000; Giovanola, 2005; Ruta et al. 2007, Anand and van Hees, 2006; Anand et 
al., 2005). Next, this case could represent Aristotle’s concept of eudemonia or flourishing: people 
fulfil the highest human potentialities by exercising virtues such as courage, self-restraint, 
generosity, munificence, magnanimity, sociability, justice, prudence and wisdom (Bragues, 2006). 
• Case I could depict stoicism, with individuals accepting events which have happened. 
Moreover, it could be linked to Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist beliefs: the 
suggested rules of behaviours come from God through the voice of prophets or from the Truth 
achieved by individual reasoning, and freedom consists of following them, i.e. the goals are fixed 
by something external to the individual will or they are the same for each individual or they are not 
chosen differently by individuals (for recent examples, Romar, 2002; Martin Calkins, 2000; 
Bloodgood et al., 2008; Conroy and Emerson, 2004; Angelidis and Ibrahim, 2004; Wong, 2008; 
Longenecker, et al., 2004). Finally, this case could depict Nietzsche’s fidelity to earth, with 
individuals being perceived within nature. 
• Case II could represent Kant’s postulates that practical reason discerns universal and absolute 
duties (the ethical imperative), i.e. individuals freely determine the goals of their actions. Moral 
lives lead to partial happiness, postponing full happiness as a gift in a spiritual life after death 
(Martin, 2008): i.e. the stress is more on ethics than on happiness. Next, it could be linked to 
Schopenhauer’s four ethical stages, where individuals temporarily forget constraints from the 
natural forces with the arts, with pietas they perceive a common status with other people and they 
try to alleviate the common pain, with the ascetic attitude people reduce pleasure from natural 
forces, and with suicide, people go against natural forces, i.e. individuals freely determine the goals 
of their actions. A positive reward from moral behaviour arises from the applause of our conscience 
(Gossling, 2003): i.e. the stress is more on unhappiness than on ethics. 
Three remarks are needed here. First, material happiness implicitly or explicitly renounced by 
religions is here represented by the missed happiness to meet social or individual moral constraints. 
Second, the perceived lack of freedom might be temporally mitigated (Schopenhauer) or might not 
be perceived at all (hypocritical people); similarly, the perception of the happiness renounced might 
be temporally mitigated (Stoics) or might not be perceived at all (religious people). Third, to some 
extent, Simon’s satisfactory approach could be linked to Case 2 also: the individual accepts a 
subjectively specified gap between the expected and the achieved goal, due for example to costs of 
aquiring additional information or to costs of performing calculations. 
Table 1 summarises the main ethical approaches suggested from the philosophical literature 
together with those highlighted by the psychological and socio-economic literature. 
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Table 1.Allocations of the main ethics to the four polar cases. 
 Philosophy Psychology Socio-Economics 
1 Mill Relativism (Foresyth, 1980) 
Teologism (Hunt & Vitell, 1986) 
Pre-Conventional (Kohlberg, 
1971) 
Performance/achievement 
orientation 
Individualism (Hofstede, 
1980) 
Copper rule * 
2 Aristotle, Sen Teologism (Hunt & Vitell, 1986) Pre-Conventional (Kohlberg, 
1971) 
Welfare relationship 
orientation 
Individualism (Hofstede, 
1980) 
Copper rule * 
I Non-Protestant Christian, 
Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, 
Hindu, Taoist, Confucian, 
Stoic, Nietzsche 
Community or Divinity (Jensen, 1991)
Moral intensity (Jones, 1991) 
Deontologism (Hunt & Vitell, 1986) 
Idealism (Foresyth, 1980) 
Post- Conventional (Kohlberg, 
1971) 
Collectivism (Hofstede, 1980)
II Kant, Schopenhauer, Protestant 
Christian 
Autonomy (Jensen, 1991) 
Moral intensity (Jones, 1991) 
Deontologism (Hunt & Vitell, 1986) 
Conventional (Kohlberg, 
1971) 
Individualism (Hofstede, 
1980) 
Golden rule * 
* The Golden and Copper rules will be depicted as extensions. 
 
Six remarks are needed here. First, religions are considered here because of their impacts on the 
cultural characteristics of societies imbued with their moral principles, rather than for people 
following their commands or believing in their principles. This suggested distinguishing non-
Protestant Christians from Protestant Christians: non-Protestant Christians show a lesser attitude 
toward cooperation, a larger willingness to break legal rules (such as to cheat on taxes, to accept 
bribes or to avoid a fare on public transport), and a lower level of trust in others (Guiso et al., 2003); 
they do not share the universalizability criterion that came out of Western rationalist philosophy 
(Jensen, 2006); and they show a lesser attitude to Corporate Social Responsibility in terms of 
equality (such as treating all employees and job applicants equally, regardless of gender, race, 
religion or sexuality) and rights (such as reducing human rights abuses in the world) (Brammer et 
al., 2007). This could be explained by remembering that Protestants rejected the Catholic sacrament 
of penance, and a person can obtain pardon for sins committed, provided that he performs certain 
acts of reparation, while for Catholics, the cost of defection in any contractual relationship remains 
low since such pardon can always be obtained with the intervention of a priest (Blum and Dudley, 
2001): however, the equilibrium arising in Protestant societies, where individual compliance to 
rules is formal and social sanctions towards incompliance are crucial, could be unstable (think of 
immigration) if deviant behaviours expand to a significant proportion of the population and/or if 
social reprobation is adopted by an insignificant proportion of the population (McClearly, 2007). 
Similarly, the Golden rule is here considered as a universal moral principle implying (not a fully 
developed system of ethics) an impartial perspective, without abandoning sympathy for the other, to 
commit to social equity, and to treat other moral persons as ends, not merely as means to an end, in 
other words it is here used as a short form of the categorical imperative, although it is imperfectly 
derived from it. This suggested one should avoid linking it to religions: indeed, it is a principle of 
consistency that can be applied to any moral philosophy, not a guide to behaviour, since it does not 
imply strict duties to others (Burton and Goldsby, 2005); and it is implied by the love command 
(i.e. you will love your neighbour as yourself), but not vice-versa (Stanglin, 2005). Second, 
relativism in Forsyth (1980) means concern for benign outcomes, while relativism means 
scepticism with regard to inviolate moral principles (see Forsyth et al., 2008). Third, pre-
conventional, conventional and post-conventional in Kohlberg (1971) refer to the following 6 
stages, 2 for each of the 6 following levels. In particular, Stage 1: avoid punishment, follow rules 
only to avoid punishment, recognise only self. Stage 2: do what meets one’s own needs and let 
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others do the same, individual relativism reigns, follow rules only when it is in one’s immediate 
self-interest. Stage 3: be a good person, follow the Golden rule, maintain rules that support good 
behaviour, keep mutual relationships, show trust, take the point of view of an individual in relation 
with others. Stage 4: do what contributes to the society, group or institution as a whole, follow the 
law and fulfil actual duties to which you have agreed, recognise the consequences for society if 
everyone would do it, take the point of view of the system. Stage 5: do what produces the greatest 
good for the greatest number, recognise some non-relative values but usually focus on living by 
rules relative to the group, interest in impartiality and maintaining the social contract. Stage 6: do 
what is right because it is right, live by freely chosen universal, moral principles of justice and 
rights that would be chosen by any rational person (see Kacher et al., 2002). Fourth, individualism 
in Hofstede (1980) (or performance/achievement orientation) refers to the extent to which the ties 
between individuals are loose, so that one is expected to look after oneself and one’s family; 
collectivism (or welfare relationship orientation) refers to the extent to which people view 
themselves as a small part of a larger group so that group achievements rather than individual 
achievements are stressed (see Tavakoli et al., 2003). Fifth, the ethic of autonomy in Jensen (1991) 
refers to people as individuals who have needs, desires and preferences, where the self is restricted 
by concerns with inflicting harm on other individuals, encroaching on their rights, and consideration 
of their needs, and where the notions of taking responsibility for oneself and virtues such as self-
esteem, self-expression and independence are included; the ethic of community implies that the 
moral goal of people as members of social groups such as family, school or nation, is the fulfilment 
of the role-based duties to others, and the protection and positive functioning of the social group, 
while virtues such as self-moderation and loyalty towards social groups and their members are 
addressed; the ethic of divinity focuses on people as spiritual and religious entities, where the goal 
of the self is to become increasingly connected to or part of that which is pure or divine, and where 
injunctions and lessons are found in sacred texts and virtues such as awe, faithfulness and humility 
are stressed (see Jensen, 2008). Sixth, moral intensity in Jones (1991) is assumed to be the starting 
point of the ethical decision-making process, with the ethical perception and ethical intention that 
follow (see Karande et al., 2000). 
 
3.Comparing ethical approaches in terms of individual happiness 
The previous section provided mathematical formulas for four polar ethics, and a summary table 
linking them to the main ethics suggested by the philosophical, psychological, and socio-economic 
literature. This section aims at developing the mathematical formulas in order to obtain rankings of 
the four polar ethical approaches in terms of overall happiness and, consequently, to provide 
insights on which ethical approach should be adopted by each individual, according to his 
characteristics (income level, in DCs or in LDCs, aspiration level): some dynamics are predicted if 
happiness achieved by each person depends on happiness achieved, and actions taken, by other 
people. 
Maslow (1970) distinguishes two types of needs: deficiency needs, such as hunger, thirst, 
loneliness, or the need for security, which can be satisfied by providing adequate amounts of food, 
drink, social contact or safety; growth needs, such as learning, mastery and self-actualisation, which 
can only be satisfied by continuing development. Thus, satisfaction of growth needs implies a 
continuous increase in the aspirations, while deficiency needs are satisfied at a given saturation 
level. For the sake of simplicity, let us focus on 2 goals only (f1 and f2). For example, think of goal 
1 as deficiency needs and goal 2 as growth needs. Thus f1 measure the expected happiness from 
satisfying deficiency needs, and f2 the expected happiness from meeting growth needs. Moreover, 
without loss of generality, let us assume that constraints g and h are exponential: 
 
a21 ≤ maxa21-a11
a;  a22 ≤ maxa22-a12b;  f2 ≤ maxf2-f1c 
 
with a, b, and c>0. Finally, for the sake of concreteness, let us assume that: 
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• People in DCs can refer to several goals simultaneously, with similar relative importance. For 
our example, this implies that the expected happiness from pursuing or achieving goal f2 is concave 
in that from goal f1 (see also Binswanger, 2006) 
• People in LDCs must focus on few goals, with different relative importance. For our example, 
this implies that the expected happiness from pursuing or achieving goal f2 is convex in that from 
goal f1 (see also Kaun, 2005) 
Thus, two main contexts will be discussed. A first context where pursuing goal 1 prevents one from 
pursuing goal 2 also (section 3.2): we will refer to it as prevailing in LDCs, by having in mind low 
salaries per hour coupled with individual time constraints, or reduced social mobility (due to a rigid 
social structure) or limited access to facilities. A second context where pursuing goal 1 does not 
prevent one from pursuing goal 2 (section 3.1): we will call it DCs. 
3.1.Developed Countries 
The scenario where pursuing of goal 1 reduces the potential pursuing of goal 2 at a decreasing rate 
can be depicted by a concave h (i.e. c>1). Figure 1 represents the feasible domain of f2 and f1. 
0.5 1.0 1.5
f1
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
f2
 
Figure 1. Maximal expected happiness from achieving or pursuing goal 2 (f2) as a function of the expected 
happiness from goal 1 (f1). 
Thus, analytical results are presented below: 
Case 1. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) 
a22 = maxa22–(1/b) (b/(b-1)) a21 = {maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1))+(1/a) (1/(a-1))}-(1/a) (1/(a-1)) 
λ1 = f1  λ2 = f2 
Case 2. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) 
a22 = maxa22–(1/b) (b/(b-1))  a21 = {maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1))+(1/a) (1/(a-1))}-(1/a) (1/(a-1)) 
λ2 = f2 = maxf2-{(1/c)[maxa21-(1/a)(a/(a-1))+(1/a)(1/(a-1))]/[maxa22-(1/b) (b/(b-1))+(1/b)(1/(b-1))]}(c/(c-1)) 
λ1 = f1 = {(1/c)[maxa21-(1/a)(a/(a-1))+(1/a)(1/(a-1))]/[maxa22-(1/b) (b/(b-1))+(1/b)(1/(b-1))]}(1/(c-1)) 
µ = maxa22-(1/b) (b/(b-1))+(1/b) (1/(b-1)) 
Case I. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a21 = maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1))-ε 
a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) a22 = maxa22-(1/b) (b/(b-1))-ε 
Case II. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a21 = maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1))-ε 
a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) a22 = maxa22-(1/b) (b/(b-1))-ε 
f2 = maxf2-f1c-ε 
Notice that λ1 = f1 and λ2 = f2 obtained in Case 1 (where goals are given) with respect to Case 2 
(where goals are chosen) confirm that Lagrange multipliers measure the lack of freedom to choose 
goals. 
Let us fix a = b = c = 2, maxa22= maxa21= 1, and maxf2= 3 so that the Lagrangian becomes: 
L = f1 (a11+a21)+f2 (a12+a22)-λ1 [a21-(1-a112)]-λ2 [a22-(1-a122)]- µ[f2-(3-f12)] 
10 
 
Thus, numerical results for ε = 1/5 are given by: 
Case 1. a11=1/2, a21=7/4, a12=1/2, a22=3/4, λ1=f1, λ2=f2, V(1)=1/4 (9 f1+5 f2)-f1-f2 
Case 2. a11=1/2, a21=7/4, a12=1/2, a22=3/4, λ1=f1=9/10, λ2=f2=219/100, µ=5/4, V(2)=169/400 
Case I. With given a11 = 1/2, a12 = 1/2, V(I)= 1/20(41 f1+21 f2) 
Case II. With given a11 = 1/2, a12 = 1/2, V(II)= 1/100 (294+205 f1-105 f12) 
Comparing these results lead to the following general rankings: I > 1, II > 2. In other words, in 
DCs, it is better to pursue freedom than happiness: the cost of information acquisition and 
processing, and the risk of making wrong choices and regretting missed benefits, overcome the 
potential missed happiness. 
Notice that the obtained values of V(1), V(2), V(I) and V(II) depend on the assumed value of ε, 
while rankings are independent of it. 
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Figure 2. Values of f2 as a function of f1 arising from all possible comparisons of overall happiness in 1, 2, I and 
II. Scenario A is below all curves. 
Plotting curves depicting the couples of f1 and f2 providing the same overall happiness levels lead to 
the following specific rankings (scenarios in increasing order) (see Figure 2): 
Scenario A (below all curves): II>2>I>1 
Scenario B (from A to B, the ethics I gains, the ethics 2 looses): II>I>2>1 
Scenario C (from B to C, the ethics 1 gains, the ethics 2 looses): II>I>1>2 
Scenario D (from C to D, the ethics I gains, the ethics II looses): I>II>1>2 
Results obtained above can be summarised in the following normative insights: 
• Individuals with small fj (relatively small aspirations) in DCs should firstly adopt the ethical 
approach suggested by Kant, the Protestant religion or Schopenhauer (although ethics followed by 
others will affect the former to a greater extent than the latter), and secondly the ethical approach 
suggested by Aristotle or Sen 
• Individuals with large fj (relatively large aspirations) in DCs should firstly adopt the ethical 
approach suggested by Stoics, non-Protestant religion or Nietzsche (although one must sincerely 
believe in goals suggested by these ethics), and secondly the ethical approach suggested by Mill. 
3.2.Less Developed Countries 
The scenario where pursuing of goal 1 reduces the potential pursuing of goal 2 at an increasing rate 
can be depicted by a convex h (i.e. c<1). Figure 3 represents the feasible domain of f2 and f1. 
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Figure 3. Maximal expected happiness from achieving or pursuing goal 2 (f2) as a function of the expected 
happiness from goal 1 (f1). 
Thus, analytical results are presented below. 
Case 1. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a21 = maxa21– (1/a) (a/(a-1)) 
a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) a22 = (1/c) {[maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1))+(1/a) (1/(a-1))] maxf2((1-c)/c)]}-(1/b) (1/(b-1)) 
λ1 = f1  λ2 = f2 
Case 2. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a21 = maxa21–(1/a) (a/(a-1)) 
a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) a22 = (1/c) {[maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1))+(1/a) (1/(a-1))] maxf2((1-c)/c)]}-(1/b) (1/(b-1)) 
λ1 = f1 = maxf2(1/c) λ2 = f2 = 0 
µ = (1/c) {[maxa21- (1/a) (a/(a-1))+(1/a) (1/(a-1))] maxf2((1-c)/c)]} 
Case I. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a21 = maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1)) -ε 
a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) a22 = maxa22 – (1/b) (b/(b-1)) -ε 
Case II. 
a11 = (1/a) (1/(a-1)) a21 = maxa21-(1/a) (a/(a-1)) -ε 
a12 = (1/b) (1/(b-1)) a22 = maxa22 – (1/b) (b/(b-1)) -ε 
f2 = maxf2-f1c-ε 
Notice again that λ1 = f1 and λ2 = f2 obtained in Case 1 (where goals are given) with respect to Case 
2 (where goals are chosen) confirm that Lagrange multipliers measure the lack of freedom to 
choose goals. 
Let us fix a = b = 2, c = 1/2, maxa22 = maxa21= 1, and maxf2 = 3 so that the Lagrangian becomes: 
L = f1 (a11+a21)+ f2 (a12+a22)- λ1 [a21-(1-a112)]- λ2 [a22-(1-a122)]- µ [f2-(3-f11/2)] 
Thus, numerical results for ε = 1/5 are given by: 
Case 1. a11 = 1/2, a21 = 7/4, a12 =1/2, a22 = 13, λ1 = f1, λ2 = f2, V(1) = 9/4 (f1+6 f2)-f1-f2 
Case 2. a11 = 1/4, a21 = 1/4, a12 = 3/2, a22 = 13, λ1 = f1=9, λ2 = f2 = 0, µ = 27/2, V(2) = -9/4 
Case I. With given a11 =1/2, a12 = 1/2, V(I) = 1/20(41 f1+21 f2) 
Case II. With given a11 =1/2, a12 = 1/2, V(II) = 1/100 (294-105 √f1+205 f1) 
Comparing these results lead to the following general rankings: I > 2, II > 2. In other words, in 
LDCs, it is better to avoid the achievement of your capabilities or the flourish of your potentials: 
meeting growth needs is too expensive in terms of missing deficiency needs. 
Notice that numerical results turn out to be consistent with the assumption of a concave and convex 
relationship between f2 and f1 in DCs and LDCs, respectively: indeed, in case 2, if f2 is concave in 
f1, i.e. in DCs, the total value of lack of freedom amounts to 217/50, while if f2 is convex in f1, i.e. 
in LDCs, the total value of lack of freedom amounts to 45/2. 
12 
 
0 2 4 6 8
f1
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
f2
 
Figure 4. Values of f2 as a function of f1 arising from all possible comparisons of overall happiness in 1, 2, I and 
II. Scenario A is below all curves. 
Plotting curves depicting the couples of f1 and f2 providing the same overall happiness levels lead to 
the following specific rankings (scenarios in clockwise) (see Figure 4): 
Scenario A (below all curves): II>I>1>2 
Scenario B (from A to B, the ethics 1 gains, the ethics I looses): II>1>I>2 
Scenario C (from B to C, the ethics 1 gains, the ethics II looses): 1>II>I>2 
Scenario D (from C to D, the ethics I gains, the ethics II looses) (above all curves): 1>I>II>2 
Scenario E (from D to E, the ethics I gains, the ethics 1 looses): I>1>II>2 
Scenario F (from E to F, the ethics II gains, the ethics 1 looses): I>II>1>2 
Results obtained above can be summarised in the following normative insights: 
• the poorest individuals (with relatively small aspirations) in LDCs are advised to adopt the 
ethics of Kant, the Protestant religion or Schopenhauer (scenario A and B), then the approaches of 
the Stoics, non-Protestant religions or Nietzsche 
• the richest individuals (with relatively large aspirations) in LDCs are advised to adopt the ethics 
of Mill (scenario C and D), but never the approaches of Aristotle or Sen 
• middle income people (with middle aspirations) in LDCs are advised to adopt the ethics of the 
Stoics, non-Protestant religions or Nietzsche, but never the approaches of Aristotle or Sen 
3.3.Dynamic extensions 
Several extensions of the previous framework could be developed. Under the assumption of 
rational choice of the ethical approach, among the dynamic extensions, one could propose: 
• actions at t+1 depend on actions at time t: for example, a(t+1) = a(t) + α with α a stochastic 
variable so that habits are introduced (Simsek, 2008) 
• there is stock or psychological well-being and a flow or subjective well-being: for example, 
S(t+1) – S(t) = V(t) +β, with β a stochastic variable (Konow and Earley, 2008). 
• aspiration levels move deterministically up step by step (for example, f(t+1) = f(t) + γ with γ > 
0) or change stochastically due to live events (for example, f(t+1) = f(t) + γ with γ a stochastic 
variable) (Martin, 2008) 
• actions of each individual are linked to actions taken by other people (think of the Copper rule): 
 
objCopper = f1*(a11+(1-a11^a)-ε)*probII+ ζ1*f1*(η11 a11+η21(1-a11^a)-ε)*(1-prII)+f2*(a12+(1-a12^b)-
ε)*probII+ζ2*f2*(η12 a12+η22(1-a12^b)-ε)*(1-probII) 
 
with ζj < 1 depicting the missed happiness due to the non-Pareto optimal outcomes (Non cooperate, 
Non-cooperate in the Prisoner Dilemma), while ηij < 1 depicting the small efforts in actions aij; in 
other words, happiness from a specific ethical approach could depend on the number of people 
choosing, or the probability of meeting people choosing the same approach (probII), which in turn 
can be assessed once a statistical distribution of goals over the population is assumed: this extension 
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leads us to predict a reduction of happiness from ethics 1 and 2 (see also Blum and Dudley, 2001), 
while probII, in the numerical examples developed above, are estimated to be 0.0119 (Scenario A: 
II>2>I>1), 0.0704 (Scenario B: II>I>2>1) and 0.8192 (Scenario C: II>I>1>2) for DCs, and 0.1734 
(Scenario A: II>I>1>2) and 0.0536 (Scenario B: II>1>I>2) for LDCs 
• individual happiness is affected by actions taken by other people (think of the Golden rule): 
 
objGolden = f1*(a11+(1-a11^a)-ε)*probII+ζ1*f1*(a11+(1-a11^a)-ε)*(1-prII)+ f2*(a12+(1-a12^b)-
ε)*probII+ζ2*f2*(a12+(1-a12^b)-ε)*(1-probII) 
 
with ζj < 1 depicting the missed happiness due to the non-Pareto optimal outcomes (Cooperate, 
Non-cooperate in the Prisoner Dilemma): this extension leads us to predict a reduction of happiness 
from ethics II (see again Blum and Dudley, 2001). 
Reasoning on the Golden and Copper rule extensions leads us to predict the following individual 
dynamics: a reduction of reciprocity (smaller probII) at time t is likely to reduce people willing to 
apply the Golden rule and to increase people willing to apply the Copper rule at time t+1: in other 
words, happiness from ethics II, 1 and 2 becomes smaller with respect to the I ethical approach. 
Notice that the Folk Theorem would suggest that the ethics II prevails, if people interact several 
times: however, this is more likely to occur in collectivist societies or LDCs, where the ethical 
approach I should be followed, than in individualistic societies or DCs, where the ethical approach 
II should be chosen. 
Under the assumption of non-rational choice of the ethical approach, one could suggest an 
evolutionary extension, where people experiment new ethical approaches: for example, the ethical 
approach chosen at time t+1 is the same as at time t apart from a casual variable with a specified 
stochastic distribution so that A(t+1) = A(t) + δ, with δ showing a binomial distribution. Think of 
normative and epistemic rationality in embracing religious behaviours and beliefs. 
 
4.Comparing ethical approaches in terms of social happiness 
The previous section provided insights on which ethical approach should be adopted by each 
individual, according to his characteristics (income level, in DCs or in LDCs, aspiration level), by 
predicting some dynamics if happiness achieved by each person depends on happiness achieved, 
and actions taken, by other people. This section aims at obtaining insights on which ethical 
approach should be adopted by each society, according to its characteristics (DCs or LDCs, social 
distribution of aspiration levels), at predicting overall happiness levels in alternative countries, 
according to the prevailing ethics, and at comparing these predictions with observed happiness 
levels, in order to provide an empirical test of the analytical model: some dynamics is predicted, if 
happiness achieved by each person depends on happiness achieved, and actions taken, by other 
people. 
4.1.Ethics suggested by the model 
Let us assume that: 
• the distribution is uniform over f1 and f2 for people in DCs 
• the distribution is mainly condensed on large f1 and small f2 for people in LDCs 
These assumptions, together with results obtained in section 3, lead to the following suggestions: 
• DCs should firstly choose the II over the I ethical approach, and secondly the 1 over the 2 
ethical approach 
• LDCs should firstly choose the I over the II ethical approach, and secondly the 1 over the 2 
ethical approach 
Notice that referring to a fraction of the population living in a country and considering impacts of 
one’s chosen ethics on others allows us to obtain insights on the prevailing Nash equilibrium. 
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4.2.Happiness predicted by the model 
Table 2 summarises some recent studies identifying the main ethical approaches characterising 
some countries, where studies referring to years before 1996 are excluded in order to make a 
consistent comparison with surveys estimating happiness levels here referred to (see O’Fallon and 
Butterfield (2005) for further studies estimating the impacts of philosophy and religious values on 
ethical intent and behaviour). 
Notice that the choice of ethics is here assumed to be based on moral reasoning. However, Haidt 
(2001) shows that moral emotions could map onto the three ethics of Autonomy, Community and 
Divinity. Moreover, countries are here segmented according to statistical or econometric 
comparisons between a small number of countries with respect to cultural features. Indeed, Franke 
and Nadler (2008) show that cultural dimensions in Hofstede (1980) can explain only 31% of the 
observed variance of ethical attitudes in the 44 countries sampled, and 50% in the 41 countries 
sample, where Brazil, Philippines and Japan are excluded as outlying cases; similarly, Forsyth et al. 
(2008) allocate 29 countries in terms of cultural dimensions by Forsyth (1980), relativism and 
idealism, which cover only two out of four polar ethics considered here. Finally, the choice of 
ethics is here assumed to be independent from developmental, although dependent on cultural, 
differences between countries. However, Barro and McClearly (2003) show that lower income 
people are often more devout. 
Table 2.Allocations of some countries to the four polar cases according to statistical or econometric studies. 
 1 2 I 
1  X  
2 X  X 
I Russia > USA (Beekun et al., 2005; 
Ahmed et al, 2003) 
South Africa > Germany (Pflug, 2008) 
Croatia > USA (Tavakoli et al., 2003) 
Taiwan > USA (Lu, 2001; Cherry et al., 
2003) 
Spain > Mexico (Husted et al., 1996) 
Egypt > USA (Marta et al, 2003) 
Ukraine > USA (Kennedy & Lawton, 
1996) 
Taiwan > Australia > USA (Allmon et al., 
1997) 
X China > EU 
(Vittel and 
Patwardhan, 
2008) 
El Salvador > 
USA = Canada 
(Chiasson et al., 
1996) 
Malaysia > USA 
(Karande et al., 
2000) 
India > USA 
(Kracher et al, 
2002) 
India = China = 
Malaysia (Zabid 
& Ho, 2003; 
Zabid & Ibrahim, 
2008) 
Philippines > 
USA (Vasquez et 
al., 2001) 
Chile > Australia 
(Robertson et al., 
2002) 
Mexico > Spain 
(Husted et al., 
1996) 
Malaysia > New 
Zealand 
(Goodwin & 
Goodwin, 1999) 
China > Australia 
(Tsui & Windsor, 
2001) 
II USA = Canada > El Salvador (Chiasson et 
al., 1996) 
USA > Russia (Beekun et al., 2005; 
Ahmed et al, 2003) 
USA > Philippines (Vasquez et al., 2001) 
Norway > USA 
(Falkenberg, 1998) 
Germany > South Africa 
(Pflug, 2008) 
Australia > USA 
X 
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USA > Egypt (Marta et al, 2003) 
USA > Taiwan (Lu, 2001; Cherry et al., 
2003) 
USA > Ukraina (Kennedy & Lawton, 
1996) 
USA > Norway (Falkenberg, 1998) 
USA > Brazil (Volkema and Fleury, 2002) 
USA > Malaysia (Karande et al., 2000) 
USA > Australia (Singhapakdi et al., 
2001) 
USA > India (Kracher et al, 2002) 
USA > Croatia (Tavakoli et al., 2003) 
USA > Ukraine (Kennedy & Lawton, 
1996) 
USA > China (Whitcomb et al., 1998; Lu 
& Gilmour, 2004; Ahmed et al., 2003) 
(Singhapakdi et al., 2001) 
Australia > Chile 
(Robertson et al., 2002) 
New Zealand > USA 
(Okleshen & Hoyt, 1996) 
New Zealand > Malaysia 
(Goodwin & Goodwin, 
1999) 
Australia > China (Tsui & 
Windsor, 2001) 
Austria > USA (Davis et 
al., 1998) 
 
 
X means impossible case. Comparisons refer to business ethics only. 
 
Combining the suggestions achieved in section 4.1 with the ethical approaches actually followed by 
these countries leads to the conclusion that: 
1. Countries that follow the prescribed first ethics are likely to achieve happiness levels above the 
average, once the per capita income is taken into account: examples are given by USA, Norway, 
Germany, Austria, New Zealand and Australia in DCs, China, India, Philippines, El Salvador, 
Chile, Mexico and Malaysia in LDCs 
2. Countries that do not follow the prescribed first ethics are likely to achieve happiness levels 
below the average, once the per capita income is taken into account: examples are given by 
Ukraine, Russia, Taiwan, Egypt, Croatia and South Africa in LDCs, Spain in DCs 
3. Countries that follow the prescribed first ethics but not the second one are likely to achieve 
smaller happiness levels than those following both the first and second prescribed ethics, once 
the per capita income is taken into account: examples are given by USA vs. Norway 
4. Non-Protestant DCs are likely to achieve happiness levels below the average, once the per 
capita income is taken into account: think of Japan, Israel, Italy 
5. Non-Protestant LDCs are likely to achieve happiness levels above the average, once the per 
capita income is taken into account: think of Bangladesh, Vietnam, Brazil, Pakistan 
4.3.An empirical test of the model 
Comparing predictions presented in section 4.2 with observed happiness data from the literature 
allows us to test the model. Figure 5 shows the interpolating function of the observed happiness 
levels in different countries as dependent on the per capita GDP (Inglehart et al., 2008): one can 
read it for each level of per capita GDP to obtain happiness achieved conditional on per capita 
income, and one can consider the happiness level above the interpolating function as being above 
the average level conditional to the per capita income. 
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Figure 5. Inglehart et al. (2008) subjective well-being vs. per capita gross domestic product. Well-being index is 
based on reported life satisfaction and happiness, using mean results from all available surveys conducted 1995–
2007 (cubic curve plotted; r=0.62). PPP=purchasing power parity estimates. 
Thus, all 5 predictions achieved in section 4.2 are confirmed, apart from West Germany, where 
happiness levels arise from averaging responses by people living in Western and Eastern parts after 
unification. 
Notice that non-Protestant DCs are likely to be trapped in happiness levels below the average, with 
people being driven to apply the ethics I due to the small proportion of people applying the ethics II: 
indeed, the ethical approach I is individually (although non-socially) truly rational in these 
countries, because people would choose the ethical approach II, without constraints due to 
behaviours by others, but they are forced to choose the ethical approach I, with a perceived lack of 
freedom and consequently a lower overall happiness. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Switzerland 
being significantly above the interpolating curve confirms the crucial impact of freedom of choice 
on happiness rather than political freedom (see also Verme, 2009): indeed, although they represent 
a Muslim LDC and a Protestant DC, they are both characterised by a large immigration of people 
doing low-skill jobs, where Saudi Arabia shows the lowest political and civil rights in the world 
(see Farid and Lazarus, 2008). Finally, assuming normative or epistemic rationality in embracing 
religious behaviours and beliefs might lead to similar predictions about overall happiness in non-
Protestant DCs and LDCs: indeed, the former will experience an unexpected inconsistency of the 
chosen ethics with a modern individualistic society, while the latter will observe the expected 
coherence of the chosen ethics with a community-based society. 
4.4.Dynamic insights 
Applying the individual dynamic predictions obtained in section 3.3 to Figure 2 leads to Figure 6, 
where fj are still assumed to be uniformly distributed, while curves depicting the fj values making 
ethics II as appealing as other ethical approaches move downward, to represent the decreasing 
adoption of the Golden rule and the increasing adoption of the Copper rule: indeed, Crittenden et al. 
(2009) show statistically an overall dynamics towards a cheating culture in the 36 countries 
analysed, although the tolerance towards cheating behaviour, the belief in cheating and the actual 
cheating behaviour turn out to depend on the moral philosophy assumed to be prevailing in each 
country. 
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Figure 6. Dynamics in Non-Protestant DCs: a movement of relative overall happiness from alternative ethics, for 
a given distribution of ambition levels, so that II become less and less popular. 
Under the assumption that the individual change of ethics is slower than the change in social norms, 
due for example to immigration, the analysis of Figure 6 leads us to predict the following social 
dynamics: 
• Protestant DCs are likely to move to lower happiness levels: in a more cheating society, where 
everybody cheats because everyone else does, so that the ethics I should be chosen, people still 
adopting the ethical approach II will be frustrated (here measured as the smaller overall happiness 
due to the choice of the wrong ethics). This prediction seems to be supported empirically (for 
example, Inglehart et al. (2008) show a decrease in life satisfaction scores from the earliest to the 
latest survey in USA, Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland) and theoretically (see Ott 
(2007) for a discussion on decreasing happiness in the USA) 
• Non-Protestant DCs are likely to move to higher happiness levels: in a more cheating society, 
where everybody cheats because everyone else does, so that the ethics I should be chosen, people 
adopting the ethical approach I will be gratified (here measured as the larger overall happiness due 
to the choice of the right ethics). This prediction seems to be empirically supported (for example, 
Inglehart et al. (2008) show an increase in life satisfaction scores from the earliest to the latest 
survey in Italy, Austria, France, Northern Ireland, Japan). 
Notice that Protestant DCs where immigration is smaller, so that the interaction between people 
from different cultures is smaller, are likely to show more stable happiness levels: for example, 
Inglehart et al. (2008) show a constant life satisfaction score from the earliest to the latest survey in 
Norway, Netherlands, Denmark. 
Next, applying the individual dynamic predictions obtained in section 3.3 to Figure 4 leads to 
Figure 7, where curves depicting the fj values making ethics as appealing as other ethical 
approaches are assumed to be the same, while people move towards higher ambitions in terms of 
both deficiency needs and growth needs, due to an increase in per capita income. 
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Figure 7. Dynamics in LDCs: a movement of people’s ambition levels, for given relative overall happiness from 
alternative ethics, so that the ethics 1 becomes more and more popular. 
Under the assumption that the individual change of ethics is slower than the change in per capita 
income due to economic growth, the analysis of Figure 7 leads us to predict the following social 
dynamics: 
• LDCs with an increase in per capita income are likely to move to lower happiness levels in the 
short run: in a more market oriented society, where the ethics 1 or 2 should be chosen, people still 
adopting the ethical approach I will be frustrated (here measured as the smaller overall happiness 
due to the choice of the wrong ethics). This prediction seems to be empirically supported (for 
example, Inglehart et al. (2008) show a decrease in life satisfaction scores from the earliest to the 
latest survey in India and China). 
Notice that LDCs could aspire to higher happiness levels in the long run: an increase of the 
proportion of people aiming at growth needs, due to an increase in per capita income, implies a 
larger proportion of people rationally choosing the ethics 1, i.e. a larger proportion of people being 
sensitive to the formal institutional setting with its likelihood that immoral behaviour is sanctioned, 
and to the informal social condition with its structures of rules and sanctions (Gossling, 2003). In 
other words, in the process of transition from traditional community-based cultures to modern 
individualistic societies, LDCs could move towards the Autonomy (Jensen, 2008) or the 
Conventional (Kohlberg, 1971) ethics provided suitable incentives and punishments are set up, 
while LDCs will combine Relativism (Foresyth, 1980) and Pre-Conventional (Kohlberg, 1971) 
ethics with free-market capitalism otherwise: that is, unlike Russia, Croatia, South Africa and 
Taiwan, the ethical approaches 1,II and 2,II can be favoured in these countries, by avoiding transit 
through 1,I, to reduce the costs of modernisation. 
 
5.Discussion 
The main achievements of this paper are as follows: 
• An original analytical model is provided, where overall happiness (including rationality and 
freedom) is assumed to be measured over a common scale across cultures, but to depend on ethical 
approaches (including religion and social norms), which depend on cultural differences at country 
level: as in Robertson and Crittenden (2003), linkages between the macro-level dominant moral 
philosophy in use in different cultural/economic systems and the micro-level individual behaviour 
outcomes are stressed 
• An empirical test of the analytical model is offered (unlike Robertson and Crittenden, 2003), 
being aware that the complexity and variety of ethics would make it impossible to reach any 
conclusion on purely theoretical grounds, by introducing two reasonable additional assumptions: 
deficiency needs more important than growth needs for people in LDCs with respect to people in 
DCs; and aspiration levels are uniformly distributed between deficiency and growth needs for 
people in DCs, while condensed on deficiency needs for people in LDCs 
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• Explanations of results by some empirical studies are provided: for example, the observed 
positive impact of freedom and rationality on happiness for rich, but not for poor countries is 
consistent with LDCs choosing the best ethics, while non-Protestant DCs do not, and people in 
LDCs being forced to deficiency needs, while DCs are not (Welsh, 2003); moreover, the estimated 
positive impact of religious involvement on life satisfaction confirms that religious groups show 
different attitudes towards life difficulties (such as the turmoil of economic transition) (Lelkes, 
2007); finally, it is shown that different levels of (individual) freedom imply different degrees of 
happiness, by excluding that causation works the other way (Welsh, 2003) 
• Confirmations of insights by some empirical studies are offered: for example, we show that 
communist ideology, here represented as the ethics I, has played a role comparable to that of 
religion in Eastern European countries, making people willing to sacrifice their lives for the cause 
of building a better society (Inglehart et al., 2008); moreover, when people lack the resources to 
fulfil their basic needs, the utility of freedom is relatively low, while people living in more affluent 
societies give higher priority to free choice and self-expression (Inglehart et al., 2008); finally, we 
show that the quality of social relations in the Latin American countries, here represented as the 
ethics I, could explain these being among the happiest in the world, making .people able to endure 
suffering (Haller and Hadler, 2006). 
• Confirmations of insights by some theoretical studies are offered: for example, we show that 
philosophical ethics are indispensable for explaining empirical results concerning human 
psychology, since human evaluations are involved (Haybron, 2007); moreover, we show that the 
origins of one’s desires as well as the critical reflection of, and the possible alteration of, desires are 
not necessary for happiness (Chekola, 2007); finally, by combining empirical research with an 
analytical model where a broad concept of happiness is applied, we produce suggestions on the 
manner of living which makes us happier, upon contingencies related to individual and social 
characteristics (Haybron, 2000). 
• Explanations of missed results by some empirical studies are provided: for example, the 
estimated lack of direct link between happiness and freedom highlights that individual freedom 
more than political freedom (measured as civil rights and liberties) really matters for happiness 
(Welsh, 2003); moreover, the lack of support for Chinese being more relativistic than EU people is 
likely to be due to the comparison of China with Spain and UK combined, where we stressed that 
catholic Spain should not be grouped with the non-catholic UK to represent EU people (Vittel and 
Patwardhan, 2008); finally, the estimated lack of influence of institutionalised religiosity or 
ideological freedom on life satisfaction stresses that individual freedom more than ideological 
freedom (measured as the social role of churches) really matters for happiness (Lelkes, 2007) 
 
6.Conclusion 
We feel that the analytical approach adopted here turned out to be quite successful in interpreting 
the cultural effects on happiness, by stressing individual characteristics (income and aspiration 
levels) as well as social characteristics (distribution of aspiration levels). However, some cautions 
for results obtained by this paper must be highlighted: 
• Responses to the same question (“what is your happiness level, between 0 to 4?”) might 
partially depend on cultural differences: for example, people in the USA would not like to admit 
they feel unhappy, since success and failure are typically seen as the individual’s own 
responsibility, while people in France like to blame institutions such as unions, the government or 
multinational firms, and would find it acceptable to complain about their situation (Heylighen and 
Bernheim, 2000). However, this intuition should be extended to all non-Protestant countries. 
• Explaining the average happiness level as dependent on the prevailing ethical approach in a 
country at a given per capita income means assuming that individual differences (such as education, 
health, occupation or wealth) within a country either combine similarly in different countries (for 
example, because people compare their situation with their compatriots) or have relatively small 
importance for individuals (for example, because people influence their situations according to their 
personal traits and preferences). Indeed, Heylighen and Bernheim (2000) show that correlations 
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between happiness and individual characteristics are subtler than those between happiness and 
country characteristics, although Haller and Hadler (2006) show that individual and social 
characteristics have a significant impact on happiness, where ethics is not modelled. 
• Several societal moderators (for example, language, historical traditions) have been suggested in 
the literature. However, ethics is likely to summarise them well. 
• Several social conditions (equality, justice, solidarity, peacefulness, safety and political 
stability) have been suggested in the literature. However, ethics is likely to represent well a 
common attitude to adapt or cope with them. 
The main developments for the framework suggested in this paper are as follows: 
• It may be worth to explaining theoretically the individual choice, and to measure empirically the 
social distributions, of aspiration levels 
• It may be worth to developing theoretically the deterministic and stochastic models, proposed in 
this paper as extensions 
• It may be worth to testing empirically the direct impact on happiness of cultural differences 
between countries, by referring to theoretical results obtained in this paper, i.e. to implement a 
statistical or econometric analysis that fills the gap in the literature, mainly due to the disagreement 
in segmenting countries according to ethics (for example, quite different allocations were recently 
obtained by Crittenden et al. (2009), Forsyth et al. (2008) and Franke and Nadler (2008)). 
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